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NOTES
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN TRIALS
I. INTRODUCTION
The American trial is an adversary proceeding' based on the ra-
tionale that the opposing parties, motivated by self-interest, will assure
a full and thorough presentation of the issues and relevant evidence. 2
The adversary system operates within the framework of constitutional
due process, a basic requirement of which is a fair tria 3 before an
impartial judge.4 Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring); see
B. Bo-mNr & M. GORDON, THE TRIAL OF Ta FUTURE 27 (1963); J. FRAN, A MAN'S
REACH 227-59 (B. Kristein ed. 1965).
The traditional adversary proceeding is divided into three segments: opening state-
ments, presentation of evidence, and closing arguments. Generally, the prosecution or
plaintiff has the right to make the first opening statement, present evidence first, and
make both the first and the final closing arguments. Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli,
Order of Presentation at Trial, 82 YALE LJ. 216 (1972). On the order of presentation
generally, see McKelvy, Presentation of the Case in Chief, in SUCCESSFUL JURYr TRAS
187, 192 (J. Appelman ed. 1952). See also United States ex rel. Parsons v. Adams,
336 F. Supp. 340, 343-45 (D. Conn.), affd, 456 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1971).
2. B. BOTEIN & M. GORDON, supra note 1, at 27.
Entire systems of proof have been devised on the notion that a trial is and necessarily
should be a contest over issues formulated by the parties. See Kunert, Some Observa-
tions on the Origin and Structure of Evidence Rules Under the Common Law System
and the Civil Law System of "Free Proof" in the German Code of Criminal Procedure,
16 BUFFALO L. REv. 122 (1966).
3. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S.
455 (1942); Bradley v. Gladden, 403 F.2d 858, 860 (9th Cir. 1968); State v. Win-
chester, 166 Kan. 512, 518, 203 P.2d 229, 233 (1949); Payne v. Lee, 222 Minn. 269,
275, 24 N.W.2d 259, 263-64 (1946); Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 461, 193 So. 452,
458 (1940); Coyle v. Stopak, 165 Neb. 594, 610, 86 N.W.2d 758, 770 (1957).
4. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); United States v. Hill, 332 F.2d
105, 106 (7th Cir. 1964); Gomila v. United States, 146 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir.
1944); cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (judge cannot have pecuniary in-
terest in outcome of case); American Bar Association & Association of American Law
Schools, Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, 44 A.B.AJ.
1159 (1958); Godman, Disqualifications for Bias of Judicial and Administrative Offi-
cers, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 109 (1948). See also U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ABA PROJECT
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE
TRIAL JUDGE 1.1 (Approved Draft, 1972) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS];
Conner, The Trial Judge, His Facial Expressions, Gestures and General Demeanor-
Their Effect on the Administration of Justice, 6 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 175, 176 (1967);
Rothblatt, Prejudicial Conduct of the Trial Judge in Criminal Cases, 2 CalM. L. BULL.
3 (Sept. 1966).
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in the trial of a case, but the absence of even the appearance of bias.'
Consequently, the judge must neither usurp the function of counselO
nor appear to align himself with any litigant. 7  Rather, he must seek
the truth impartially8 and guide the course of the trial" to assure a fair
presentation of the facts to the jury.10 To fulfill these responsibilities,
5. Gomila v. United States, 146 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1944); ABA STAND-
ARWs 6.4.
6. United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833, 834 (2d Cir. 1961); Commonwealth
v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 338, 186 A. 177, 179 (1936).
7. United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973) (conviction reversed
because of trial judge's appearance of partiality); Greener v. Green, 460 F.2d 1279 (3d
Cir. 1972); Kramer v. United States, 408 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Hill, 332 F.2d 105, 106 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. Curcio, 279 F.2d 681, 682
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960); Smith v. Welch, 189 F.2d 832, 837 (10th
Cir. 1951); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("He
[the trial judge] cannot press upon the jury the weight of his influence any more than
he can eliminate the jury altogether.... []e cannot be an advocate; he cannot
urge his own view of the guilt or innocence of the accused"); Hunter v. United States,
62 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1932) ("It is vastly more important that the attitude of the
trial judge should be impartial than that any particular defendant, however guilty he
may be, should be convicted"); State v. Bordelon, 141 La. 611, 614, 75 So. 429, 430
(1917); Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219, 224 (1870); People v. London, 40 Mich. App.
124, 198 N.W.2d 723 (1972); Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 338, 186
A. 177, 179 (1936); Hargrove v. Fort Worth Elevator Co., 276 S.W. 426 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1925); cf. Glover, The Attitude of a Judge, 13 Tnx. B.J. 13 (1950):
If by his demeanor in a trial, by the tone of his voice, or any other manner
he discloses his feeling to a jury, he is not being a fair and impartial judge.
If, when a jury retires to consider of its verdict, the jurors have gained no
impression as to which way the judge would personally decide the case, if it
had been tried before him, then it has been fairly tried; if the jurors have
gained an impression of how the court would decide the case, the parties have
not had a fair trial.
See also Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 365-66 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (robbery prose-
cution in which trial judge's attitude seemed to favor prosecution); Hunter v. United
States, 62 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1932) (trial judge's questions could reasonably have led
jury to believe that judge did not believe defendant's testimony).
8. Bova v. Bova, 135 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Mo. App. 1940); Gitelson & Gitelson,
A Trial Judge's Credo Must Include His Affirmative Duty To Be an Instrumentality of
Justice, 7 SANTA CLARA LAw. 7 (1966); see C. WYZANsK, WHEREAs-A JUDGE'S
PREmsES 15-16 (1965).
9. Hunter v. United States, 62 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1932); see C. WYZANsKU,
supra note 8, at 15-16; Sheintag, The Cold Neutrality of an Impartial Judge, 19 N.Y.
ST. B. Ass'N BULL. 227, 229 (1947). See also D. PECK, COMPLEMENT OF COURT AND
COUNSEL 9 (1954); Noonan, The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confiden-
tiality, 64 MIcK. L. Rav. 1485, 1487 (1966).
10. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ('The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . ... "); id. amend. VI (impartial jury); id. amend.
VII (trial by jury in civil cases). Most states preserve the right to trial by jury in
civil as well as criminal cases. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI, § 16; IND. CONST. art. I,
§ 20; PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 6. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 38; FED. R. CRm. P. 23; W.
FoRSyTm, HI-1STORY OF TRrAL BY JURY (2d ed. 1875).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/4
JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN TRIALS
federal and many state courts have recognized the right of the trial
judge to question witnesses, admonish counsel, and comment on the
evidence.
This Note will analyze existing case law to ascertain the extent to
which a trial judge may properly intervene in the course of a trial, in
view of his role in relation to the adversary system, the jury, and the
requirement of a fair trial.
II. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
A. Comments on the Evidence
At common law the trial judge was an active participant in the trial,1
calling and questioning witnesses, analyzing the evidence, and guiding
the jury by sharing his opinion even on matters of fact.' 2 The Supreme
Court, in exercising its supervisory powers over the federal courts, has
adopted a role for federal trial judges that is only slightly more restricted
than the active role of the common law judge.' 3 The right of the trial
judge to comment on the evidence has been retained,' 4 but the Court
11. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933); Wornom v. Hampton
Normal & Agric. Inst., 144 Va. 533, 538-39, 132 S.E. 344, 346 (1926). See also
M. HALE, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 291-92 (1779); 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 784 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as WiGMORE]; Sunderland, The
Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MIcH. L. REv. 302, 305-06 (1915) [hereinafter
cited as Sunderland].
12. See M. HALE, supra note 11, at 291-92; Scott, Trial by Jury and the Reform of
Civil Procedure, 31 HAv. L. REv. 669, 680 (1918); Sunderland 305-06. See also
Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933).
For general discussions of the Anglo-American jury system, see H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMEIcAN JuRY (1966); Knittel & Seiler, The Merits of Trial by
Jury: Some Aspects of English Jury Trial and Continental Modes of Trial, 30 CAME.
L.J. 316 (1972); Rosenberg, The Adversary Proceeding in the Year 2000, 1 PROSPECTUS
5 (1968).
13. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933); Starr v. United States,
153 U.S. 614 (1894).
14. See, e.g., Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469-71 (1933); United
States v. Baxley, 406 F.2d 397, 398 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1007 (1969);
Kyle v. United States, 402 F.2d 443, 444-45 (5th Cir. 1968); Thurmond v. United
States, 377 F.2d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 1967); Jones v. United States, 361 F.2d 537, 540
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Franano v. United States, 310 F.2d 533, 537-39 (8th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 940 (1963); United States v. Gibas, 300 F.2d 836, 839 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 817 (1962); Roberts v. United States, 284 F.2d 209,
211 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 863 (1961); Wegman v. United States,
272 F.2d 31, 34 (8th Cir. 1959). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 51; FED. R. CRIM. P. 30;
8 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 30.09 (2d ed. 1972). See generally Farley, In-
structions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process, 42 YALE L.J. 194 (1932);
Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials, 14 MASS. L.Q. 48 (1928).
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has carefully emphasized that the jury is to remain the ultimate fact-
finder with any comment by the trial judge not to be interpreted by
the jurors as binding upon them.' 5
In contrast to the federal system, most states early began to circum-
scribe the role of the trial judge by prohibiting him from informing
the jury of his view of the facts.'" It has thus been suggested that
the rule proscribing a judge's commenting on the evidence in state
courts' 7 was created to prevent the judge from usurping the fact-find-
ing function of the jury' 8 and, more generally, to prevent the judge
from revealing to the jurors his attitudes on the merits of the case. "
The rule, though rejected by federal courts and long criticized by com-
mentators, has been retained in most states.20
15. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 472 (1933); Starr v. United States,
153 U.S. 614, 625 (1894).
16. ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 12 (1910) (now Aiuz. CONST. art. 6, § 27); Aox.
CONST. art. 7, § 23; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 19 (1879) (amended 1934, CAL. CONST.
art. VI, § 10, cl. 3); DEL. CONST. art. 4, § 22 (1897) (now DEL. CONST. art. 4, § 19);
NEv. CONST. art. 6, § 12; S.C. CONST. art. 5, § 26; TENN. CONST. art. 5, § 5 (1796)
(now TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 9); WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 16; Wood v. Deutchman,
75 Ind. 148, 151-52 (1881); Heithecker v. Fitzhugh, 41 Kan. 50, 20 P. 465 (1889);
Winter v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Pythias, 96 Mo. App. 1, 16, 69 S.W. 662, 666
(1902) (and cases cited); Yoder v. Reynolds, 28 Mont. 183, 196, 72 P. 417, 420
(1903); Kleutsch v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 72 Neb. 75, 100 N.W. 139 (1904);
Kirk v. Territory of Okla., 10 Okla. 46, 54-65, 60 P. 797, 800-03 (1900); Mazer v.
Commonwealth, 142 Va. 649, 128 S.E. 514 (1925); White v. Sohn, 63 W. Va. 80, 82,
59 S.E. 890, 891 (1907). But see State v. Cianflone, 98 Conn. 454, 467-70, 120 A.
347, 353-54 (1923); Presley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry., 130 Minn. 121, 124,
153 N.W. 115, 116 (1915); Flanders v. Colby, 28 N.H. 34, 39 (1853); Merklinger v.
Lambert, 76 N.I.L. 806, 813, 72 A. 119, 122 (1908); Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y.
420, 425-26, 28 N.E. 651, 652-53 (1891); Fredericks v. Northern Cent. Ry., 157 Pa.
103, 128-29, 27 A. 689, 696-97 (1893); State v. Lynott, 5 R.I. 295 (1858); People
v. Lee, 2 Utah 441, 452-54 (1878); Seviour's Adm'r v. Rutland R.R., 88 Vt. 107, 110, 91
A. 1039, 1040 (1914).
17. WIGMORE § 2484; Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REv. 729 (1906), reprinted in 8 BAYLOR L. REV.
1 (1956); see United States v. Williams, 473 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1973); Nordmann v.
National Hotel Co., 425 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970).
18. See WIGMOPE §§ 2549-55a; Hogan, The Strangled Judge, 14 J. AM. JuD.
Soc'y 116 (1930); McCormick, Comment on Kolkman v. People, 16 J. AM. JtJD.
Soc'y 151 (1933); Sunderland; Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of the Jury Trial,
12 J. AM. JuD. Soc'y 166 (1929).
19. See Johnson, supra note 14; Sunderland 309; Wright, The Invasion of the
Jury, Temperature of the War, 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 137 (1953); Wright, Instructions to
the Jury, Summary Without Comment, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 177.
20. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 270 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 81-1104 (1956); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 67 (Smith-Hurd 1968); IowA CODE ANN. § 780.9 (1950);
LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 1792 (West 1960); LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 806
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/4
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Regardless of their views concerning comments on the evidence,
federal and state courts recognize that a trial must afford the opportunity
to inquire into the truth or falsity of the factual allegations and to as-
certain and apply the relevant law to achieve a just result.21 Conse-
quently, a judge has a duty to be more than a mere moderator between
the litigants; 2 he has an independent duty to investigate the facts.2"
However, since this duty may conflict with the requirement established
in many state courts that the judge not comment on the evidence, judges
in these jurisdictions must guard carefully against creating the appear-
ance of partiality.2 4
B. The Right to Examine Witnesses
The right of the trial judge to examine witnesses is widely recognized
by federal and state courts,25 including courts in many of the states
which prohibit judges' comments on the evidence. 6 Judicial examina-
(West 1967); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1105 (1965); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 231, § 81 (1956); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-7-155 (civil), 99-17-35 (criminal)
(1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-180 (1969); N.D.R. Civ. P. 51(a) (1960); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 17.255.1 (1971). But see Ch. 2096, § 1, [1877] Fla. Laws - (repealed 1967);
Judicature Act, ch. 18, § 58, [1915] Mich. Acts 122 (repealed 1961); Act of Feb. 12,
1880, ch. 6, § 23, [1880] N.M. Acts 51, as amended, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1 51(h)
(1966) (now allowing comment). See also notes 11 supra, 22 & 45 infra. See gen-
erally Lukowsky, The Constitutional Rights of Litigants to Have the State Trial Judge
Comment Upon the Evidence, 55 KY. L.J. 122, 125 (1966).
21. For a discussion of the judicial system's responsibility to resolve conflicts in a
just manner, see B. BOTEIN & M. GORDON, supra note 1; J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND
FUNCION OF LAw 705-10, 759-62 (1950); Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New
Deal, 47 HARv. L. REv. 913 (1934); Beckham, Preservation of the Adversary System,
78 CoMM. L.J. 77 (1973); Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias
in Legal Decision Making, 86 HIv. L. REV. 386 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Nordmann v. National Hotel Co., 425 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970);
Heron v. Heron, 393 F.2d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 1968); ABA ADvisoRY COMM. ON THE
JUDGE'S FUNCTION, THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN DEALINo wrrH TRmL DISRUPTIONS, A.1
(1971):
General Responsibility of the Trial Judge.
In the administration of criminal justice, the trial judge has the responsi-
bility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the interests of the
public. The adversary nature of the proceedings does not relieve the trial
judge of the obligation of raising on his own initiative, at all appropriate
times in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly affect a just
determination of the trial.
23. See cases cited note 27 infra.
24. Gitelson & Gitelson, supra note 8, at 7, 9.
25. See notes 27 & 28 infra. See also A. ABBOTT, CIVIL JURY TRIALS § 125
(5th ed. P. Viesselman 1935); A. ABBor, CimINAL TRIAL PRACTICE § 323 (4th ed.
P. Viesselman 1939).
26. Compare CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 19 (1879) (repealed 1966) with People v.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tion of witnesses is allowed for two reasons: to elicit the truth27 and
to clarify the facts for the jury.28  Since the trial judge's failure to ex-
amine witnesses may result in an injustice, 9 the trial judge may be
under an affirmative duty to question witnesses in appropriate circum-
stances.3 0 The judge may, for example, have "the duty to participate
Corrigan, 48 Cal. 2d 551, 559, 310 P.2d 953, 958 (1957); compare S.C. CONST. art. 5,
§ 26 (1895) with State v. Chasteen, 288 S.C. 88, 99, 88 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1955);
compare ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 67 (Smith-Hurd 1968) with People v. Palmer,
27 Ill. 2d 311, 314-15, 189 N.W.2d 265, 267 (1963); compare ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 270
(1958) with Cook v. State, 57 So. 2d 832, 834 (Ala. App. 1952); compare Kleutsch
v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Neb. 75, 100 N.W. 139 (1904), with Coyle v. Stopak,
165 Neb. 594, 610, 86 N.W. 758, 770 (1957).
27. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
United States v. Stone, 431 F.2d 1286, 1291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912
(1970); Young v. Slaney, 255 F.2d 785, 787 (1st Cir. 1958); Smith v. Welch, 189 F.2d
832, 837 (10th Cir. 1951); Simon v. United States, 123 F.2d 80, 83 (4th Cir. 1941);
Montrose Contracting Co. v. Westchester County, 94 F.2d 580, 583 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 561 (1938); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1929);
People v. Corrigan, 48 Cal. 2d 551, 559, 310 P.2d 953, 958 (1957); State v. Monroe,
4 Conn. Cir. 541, 236 A.2d 471 (1967); People v. Palmer, 27 Ill. 2d 311, 314-15,
189 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1963); Coyle v. Stopak, 165 Neb. 594, 610, 86 N.W.2d 758,
770 (1957); Commonwealth v. Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 338, 186 A. 177, 179
(1936); State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 99, 88 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1955).
28. United States v. McCarthy, 473 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v.
Aguiar, 472 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Watson, 466 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Sutherland, 463 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1972); Bryant v. United States, 462
F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1972); United States v. Esquer, 459 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Cassell, 440 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Tyminski,
418 F.2d 1060, 1062 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1075 (1970); Kramer v.
United States, 408 F.2d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Godel, 361 F.2d 21
(4th Cir. 1966); Hoffler v. United States, 231 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1956); Griffin v.
United States, 164 F.2d 903, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1947); Pariser v. City of New York,
146 F.2d 431, 433 (2d Cir. 1945); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bates, 76 F.2d 160
(8th Cir. 1935); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1929); People v. Ottey,
5 Cal. 2d 714, 721, 56 P.2d 193, 196 (1936); Hart v. Farris, 218 Cal. 69, 21 P.2d
432 (1933); People v. Lopez, 124 Cal. App. 2d 100, 101, 268 P.2d 171, 172 (1954);
People v. Reid, 72 Cal. App. 611, 617-18, 237 P. 824, 827 (1925); Colee v. State,
75 Ind. 511, 514 (1881); Cook v. State, 36 Ala. App. 449, 451-52, 57 So. 2d 832, 833
(1952).
29. Thomas, Judge's Participation in the Trial of Civil Cases and in Settlement
of Cases, in PROcEEDiNGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRIAL JUDGEs 68,
71 (1961).
30. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("He surely has the duty to [call and examine witnesses] before resorting
to guess-work in establishing liability . . . ."); United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967); Griffin v. United States, 164 F.2d 903
(D.C. Cir. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 336 U.S. 704 (1948); Montrose Contracting
Co. v. Westchester County, 94 F.2d 580 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 561 (1938);
People v. Lopez, 124 Cal. App. 2d 100, 102, 268 P.2d 171, 172 (1954).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss4/4
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in the examination of witnesses when necessary to bring out matters
that have been insufficiently developed by counsel." 31
The right, or duty in some instances, of the trial judge to examine
witnesses is not, however, without limits. Consistent with the require-
ment that the judge remain an impartial participant, his examination
of witnesses must not give the jury the impression that he is an advo-
cate for one of the parties.3 2 This restriction is particularly important in
criminal proceedings where it is essential that the trial judge not assume,
in the eyes of the jury, the role of the prosecutor23 Furthermore, a
trial judge's examination of a witness may be held prejudicial when it
casts doubt upon, or reflects the judge's opinion of, a witness' credi-
bility, because it is solely within the province of the jury to determine
the credibility of a witness' testimony."
31. United States v. Ostendorff, 371 F.2d 729, 732 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 982 (1967). See R. BOWERS, JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRIA CouRTs §§ 399, 401
(1931). For discussion of the attempts by Judge Sirica of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia to uncover the facts of the Watergate burglary and
related illegal campaign activities, see TIME, Jan. 7, 1974, at 8.
32. United States v. Stone, 431 F.2d 1286, 1291 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
912 (1970) (dictum); United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir.
1970) (clarifying questions allowed, but questioning "must not be so zealously pursued
as to give the impression of partisanship or the impression that he believes one ver-
sion of the evidence and disbelieves or doubts another"); Jackson v. United States,
329 F.2d 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Holmes v. United States, 271 F.2d 635, 639
(4th Cir. 1959) (vigorous questioning by trial judge may give jury the impression of
judicial partisanship); Blunt v. United States, 244 F.2d 355, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
(constitutional right of trial by jury in criminal trials limits role of judge); Crowe v.
MiManno, 225 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1955); Blumberg v. United States, 222 F.2d 496,
501 (5th Cir. 1955); Billeci v. United States, 184 F.2d 394, 397 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Gomila v. United States, 146 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir. 1944); State v. Monroe, 4
Conn. Cir. 541, 543, 236 A.2d 471, 473 (1967); Holtel v. State, 290 N.E.2d 775
(Ind. App. 1971); Pothast v. Chicago Gr. W.R.R., 110 Iowa 458, 460, 81 N.W. 693,
694 (1900); State v. Haycock, 296 A.2d 489 (Me. 1972); Coyle v. Stopak, 165 Neb.
594, 609-11, 86 N.W.2d 759, 770 (1957). See also ABA STAiDwARDS, comment 1.3.
33. United States v. Williams, 473 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Jacquillon, 469 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1972); Herman v. United States, 289 F.2d 362
(5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Marzano, 149 F.2d 923, 926 (2d Cir. 1945) ("Prose-
cution and judgment are two quite separate functions in the administration of justice;
they must not merge"); Williams v. United States, 93 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1937):
mhe harm done is not diminished where the judge, by reason of unrestrained
zeal, or through inadvertance, departs from that attitude of disinterestedness
which is the foundation of a fair and impartial trial.
People v. Roby, 38 Mich. App. 387, 196 N.W.2d 346 (1972); State v. Winchester,
166 Kan. 512, 203 P.2d 229 (1949).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Tobin, 426 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Orstein, 355 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1966); Peckham v. United States,
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It is also improper for the trial judge to usurp the examination of
witnesses by counsel when they are conducting their cases in an able
and lawyer-like manner, because in doing so the judge may interfere
with the orderly presentation of the case35 and demonstrate a lack
of respect for counsel.36  Moreover, the attorney is faced with a dilemma
by the judge's action-whether to object to preserve his appeal, or to
refrain from objecting to prevent jury prejudice against his client.8 7
Because juries are highly sensitive to trial judges' comments and ac-
tions,3 8 excessive participation by the trial judge may usurp the jury's
210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 912 (1955). See also
Rothblatt, supra note 4, at 5. But see United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297, 312-13
(3d Cir. 1954).
35. In re United States, 286 F.2d 556, 561 (Ist Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962); United States v. Marzano,
149 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1945); Gomila v. United States, 146 F.2d 372, 375 (5th
Cir. 1944); Williams v. United States, 93 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1937); People v.
Lopez, 124 Cal. App. 2d 100, 101, 268 P.2d 171, 172 (1954); People v. Giacomino,
347 111. 523, 528, 180 N.E. 437, 439 (1932); Miland v. Meiswinkel, 82 App. Div. 522,
527-28 (I. 1899); State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 99, 88 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1955).
36. See ABA STNDARns 1.1(c) and official commentary.
37. In re United States, 286 F.2d 556, 561 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962):
Counsel, as in this case, who sees the examination of his witnesses taken over
by the judge and led into matters the witnesses were not intended to cover in
their testimony and so opened for cross-examination as to those matters by
the other side, finds himself in a most difficult and embarrassing situation.
In the first place, it is a delicate matter about which counsel think twice to
object to any question asked by a judge. In the second place, if counsel ob-
jects to a judge's question on the ground that it leads the witness into matters
he was not offered to testify about, counsel runs the risk, exemplified in this
case, of comment by the judge before the jury implying that he is seeking to
cut off legitimate inquiry. On the other hand, if counsel does not object he
soon finds his witness floundering and displaying ignorance and, again as in
this case, provoking critical comments by the judge either on the witness's
intelligence or on counsel's failure to prepare his case.
See Cook v. State, 36 Ala. App. 449, 451, 57 So. 2d 832, 834 (1952) (when defense
counsel objected to trial judge's extensive questioning, trial judge replied: "[l]s it
your contention that you don't want all the evidence brought out-").
38. Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612 (1946); Starr v. United States,
153 U.S. 614, 626 (1894):
It is obvious that under any system of jury trials the influence of the
trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his
lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove con-
trolling.
United States v. Tobin, 426 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1970); Franano v. United States,
310 F.2d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 940 (1963); United States v.
Carmel, 267 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1959); State v. Philpot, 97 Iowa 365, 369, 66 N.W.
730, 732 (1896). See also ABA ST.mDARDs 6.4.
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function of determining the facts. 39 One commentator has stated that
a "remark or indication from the bench will have more effect on the
jurors than will testimony by the witnesses who testify under oath."40
To assure maintenance of distinct roles for judge and jury,41 and to pre-
vent a deprivation of any litigant's right to a fair trial,42 some courts
have held that it is preferable for a trial judge "to err on the side of
abstention from interruption of the case rather than on the side of ac-
tive participation in it."43
C. Admonitions to Counsel
Both state and federal trial judges may admonish counsel. 44  The
39. Cook v. State, 36 Ala. App. 449, 451-52, 57 So. 2d 832, 834 (1952). See
also cases cited note 91 infra.
40. Conner, supra note 4, at 179. See also United States v. Pellegrino, 470
F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 918 (1973); Moody v. United
States, 377 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833,
834 (2d Cir. 1961).
41. See United States v. Aaron, 190 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1951).
42. United States v. D'Anna, 450 F.2d 1201, 1206 (2d Cir. 1971) ("It is impera-
tive for our judicial system to have judges who are impartial. While it might be
proper for a judge to question witnesses to clarify issues, such intervention should not
become the rule"); United States v. Barbour, 420 F.2d 1319, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
DiBello v. Reder A/B Svenska Lloyd v. John W. McGrath Corp., 371 F.2d 559 (2d
Cir. 1967); Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458, 466 (6th Cir. 1956):
However, the right of the trial judge to participate in the proceedings and to
interrogate witnesses is not an unlimited one. Such participation should be
exercised in conformity with the standards governing the judicial office.
The judge should exercise self-restraint and preserve an atmosphere of im-
partiality. . . . When the remarks of the judge during the course of a trial, or
his manner of handling the trial, clearly indicate a hostility to one of the
parties, or an unwarranted pre-judgment of the merits of the case, or an align-
ment on the part of the Court with one of the parties for the purpose of
furthering or supporting the contentions of such party, the judge indicates,
whether consciously or not, a personal bias and prejudice which renders in-
valid any resulting judgment in favor of the party so favored.
Crowe v. DiManno, 225 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1955).
43. Blumberg v. United States, 222 F.2d 496, 501 (5th Cir. 1955). See also
Hunter v. United States, 62 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1932); ABA STANDARDS, comment
1.(a).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 894 (1963); City of Chicago v. Lcseth, 142 Ill. 642, 643, 32 N.E. 428, 428
(1892). See also R. BowERs, supra note 31, at § 282:
The trial judge has the undoubted right, which sometimes rises to the dignity
and obligation of a duty, to rebuke or reprimand counsel for transgressing the
established and known requirements of proper procedure, not as a punishment
of the attorney or the party he represents, but as a preventive of injury to
the adverse party.
But see Rothblatt, supra note 4, at 3 ("lt is as much error for the judge to disparage
defense counsel as it is for the judge to indicate bias against defendant").
851
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cases reveal that this right generally is exercised in response to actions
or statements by counsel that may unfairly and adversely affect the
rights of the opposing party.45 It is imperative for two reasons that
the trial judge exercise self-restraint when he comments upon or criti-
cizes the conduct of counsel. 46 First, the trial judge should display
professional respect toward counsel, who along with the judge are offi-
cers of the court.4 Secondly, the jury is more likely to perceive a
lack of judicial impartiality in an admonition to counsel than in the
judge's examination of witnesses.4 Most courts, therefore, agree that
any comments admonishing counsel, whether for the handling of a
client's case or because of counsel's courtroom behavior, should not
be made in the presence of the jury49 since the jury might construe the
judge's comments as opinions on the merits of the litigant's case, rather
than as comments directed solely to the litigant's counsel.50
45. See, e.g., United States v. Esquer, 459 F.2d 431, 435-36 (7th Cir. 1972)
("mhe judge has the power to cure potential error caused by overzealous advocacy
on the part of a prosecutor by admonition and instruction to disregard"); Hansen v.
Boots, 41 S.D. 96, 168 N.W. 798 (1918) (improper and prejudicial questioning);
Shores v. Simanton, 99 Vt. 191, 130 A. 697 (1925) (offer of inadmissible evidence to
prejudice jury); ef. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 386-91 (7th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973) (improper remarks by prosecutor in presence of
and directed to jury).
46. See, e.g., Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 983 (5th Cir. 1968) (prejudi-
cial remarks by trial judge to defense counsel); Moody v. United States, 377 F.2d 175
(5th Cir. 1967) (conviction reversed because trial judge congratulated witness for
helping to incriminate defendant); Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 912 (1955). But cf. Pietzuk v. Kansas City Ry., 289
Mo. 135, 158-59, 232 S.W. 987, 989 (1921); Massey v. Alston, 173 N.C. 215, 225,
91 S.E. 964, 968-69 (1917) (extent of judge's reprimand is within sound discretion of
trial judge).
47. See ABA STANDARDS 1.1(c); ef. United States v. Crovedi, 467 F.2d 1032
(7th Cir. 1972); State v. Lemmand, 12 N.C. App. 128, 131, 182 S.E.2d 636, 638
(1971) (new trial granted because court sustained its own objections to nine questions
propounded by defense counsel).
48. United States v. Williams, 447 F.2d 894, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1971); Bursten v.
United States, 395 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir. 1968). See also ABA STANDADS 1.1(c),
4(a).
49. United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 848
(1973); United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973); Bursten v. United
States, 395 F.2d 976, 984 (5th Cir. 1968); Young v. United States, 346 F.2d 793
(D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 66 n.3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 894 (1963); Lau Lee v. United States, 67 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1933).
50. United States v. Coke, 339 F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1964):
Although the judge's caustic and disparaging remarks were, for the most part,
directed at defense counsel, they undoubtedly gave the jury the impression that
the defendant's case was of little substance and was not worthy of very much
attention.
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Ill. TRIAL COMMENTARY AND APPELLATE RE iEw
The nature of the case-civil or criminal-may determine the ex-
tent to which the trial judge should participate in a trial. Since the p0-
tential for loss of liberty is greater in criminal than civil cases,51 the
due process guarantee of a fair trial will be more rigorously enforced
in criminal cases, 52 notwithstanding the recent expansion of due process
in the civil context.53 Therefore, although some courts have held that
the degree of a trial judge's intervention in a trial should not reflect
the civil-criminal dichotomy,5 4 most appellate courts will allow a trial
judge less latitude in criminal cases in which the judge intervenes in
the course of the trial.55
But see United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 894
(1963); United States v. Frascone, 299 F.2d 824 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
910 (1962).
51. Gagnon v. ScarpeUi, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972): Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Compare id. with United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
The requirements for due process in civil cases have been expanded by the Supreme
Court in recent years. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (pre-judgment
replevin); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to courts for indigent
divorce litigants): Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing required prior to
termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969) (pre-judgment garnishment of wages).
52. Cf. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954):
[The trial judge's] behavior precluded that atmosphere of austerity which
should especially dominate a criminal trial and which is indispensable for an
appropriate sense of responsibility on the part of the court, counsel and jury.
United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 848 (1973);
Gomila v. United States, 146 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1944); note 3 supra.
53. Compare Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973), and United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973), with Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
54. Crowe v. DiManno, 225 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1955); Commonwealth v.
Safis, 122 Pa. Super. 333, 338, 186 A. 177, 179 (1936).
55. Sce United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 17 (1956); cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 391 (1971) (Black, J., dis-
senting):
Civil lawsuits, however, are not like government prosecutions for crime. Civil
courts are set up by government to give people who have quarrels with their
neighbors the chance to use a neutral governmental agency to adjust their
differences. In such cases the government is not usually involved as a party,
and there is no deprivation of life, liberty, or property as punishment for
crime. Our Federal Constitution, therefore, does not place such private dis-
putes on the same high level as it places criminal trials and punishment.
There is consequently no necessity, no reason, why government should in civil
trials be hampered or handicapped by the strict and rigid due process rules
the Constitution has provided to protect people charged with crime.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940).
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A. General Principles
An appellate court will not necessarily reverse a verdict if the court
finds objectionable the manner or extent of a trial judge's intervention
in the trial. ' Rather, the result of an appellate court's review of a trial
judge's actions will depend upon the context in which the judge's con-
duct occurred. 57
The federal judge is hampered by a lack of specific guidelines govern-
ing his intervention, which results in part from the fact that the Supreme
Court has offered little assistance in this area.58  Not since 1933, in
Quercia v. United States,59 has the Court attempted to delineate the
proper role of the trial judge in the federal courts.
In Quercia the defendant had been indicted for a federal narcotics vio-
lation. The district court judge issued the following instruction to the
jury:
And now I am going to tell you what I think of the defendant's testi-
mony. You may have noticed, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, that he
wiped his hands during his testimony. It is rather a curious thing, but
that is almost always an indication of lying. Why it should be so we
don't know, but that is the fact. I think that every single word that man
said, except when he agreed with the government's testimony, was a lie.00
Quercia was convicted and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed.61 The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the
conviction, holding that Quercia had been denied a fair trial because
of the highly prejudicial comments of the trial judge.",
Quercia is often cited by both courts and commentators as reaffirm-
ing the federal trial judge's right to comment on the evidence in his in-
structions to the jury,6 as well as limiting the role of the trial judge. 4
56. See note 66 infra.
57. United States v. D'Anna, 450 F.2d 1201, 1206 (2d Cir. 1971); People v.
Hopkins, 29 Ill. 2d 260, 265, 194 N.E.2d 213, 216 (1963); State v. Winchester, 166
Kan. 512, 517-18, 203 P.2d 229, 233 (1949); Rothblatt, supra note 4, at 3.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. de-
nied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Pellegrino, 470 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 918 (1973).
59. 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
60. Quercia v. United States, 62 F.2d 746, 747-48 (1st Cir. 1933).
61. 62F.2d 746 (1933).
62. 289 U.S. 466 (1933).
63. See, e.g., Lowther v. United States, 455 F.2d 657 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 857 (1972); 13 B.U.L. REv. 710 (1933); 22 GEO. L.J. 324 (1934); 18
MIN. L. RaV. 441 (1934).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 386 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
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Quercia has been given these two interpretations because, while the
Court reversed Quercia's conviction on the ground of improper inter-
vention by the trial judge, the Court upheld the trial judge's right to
comment on the evidence so long as his comments are not prejudicial.
Although the two interpretations do not conflict in theory, the applica-
tion of the interpretations may produce conflicting results. Some courts,
for example, have construed Quercia as applicable only to judicial com-
ments on the evidence, while others have construed Quercia as applica-
ble to judicial intervention generally. 8
Since a trial judge does have the right to intervene in the trial
if the purpose of the intervention is proper 6 and if the judge does
not usurp the role of the jury or counsel, 67 appellate courts are gen-
erally reluctant to reverse a verdict because of the alleged miscon-
duct of the trial judge.68 This reluctance to find a trial judge's ac-
tions sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial may rest on any
of several grounds. Because the trial judge must be allowed broad dis-
cretion," ' an appellate court may reason that a trial judge's interven-
tions in a given instance did not abuse his discretion. 70 Or a court
denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973); United States v. Dopf, 434 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Calabrese, 421 F.2d 108, 113 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021
(1970); Crowe v. DiManno, 225 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v.
Gollin, 166 F.2d 123, 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
65. Compare United States v. Johnson, 463 F.2d 216, 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 858 (1972) (conviction affirmed), and United States v. Nowak, 448 F.2d 134,
140 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972) (same), with United States
v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1970) (conviction reversed), and United
States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653, 655 (2d Cir. 1952) (same).
66. See text accompanying notes 22-26, 32-37 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 38 supra, 86-89 infra.
68. See United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973); Conner, supra
note 4, at 176; cf. United States v. Workman, 454 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 857 (1972); United States v. Nowak, 448 F.2d 134 (7th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1039 (1972); City of South Omaha v. Fennell, 4 Neb. (unoff.)
427, 94 N.W. 632 (1903) (trial judge is in better position than reviewing court to
know when circumstances warrant or require interrogation of witnesses from bench).
69. See generally R. BOWERs, supra note 31.
70. Darby v. United States, 283 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1960); Griffin v. United
States, 164 F.2d 903, 905 (D.C. Cir. 1947), remanded, 336 U.S. 704 (1949); Risley v.
Lenwell, 129 Cal. App. 2d 608, 634, 277 P.2d 897, 909 (1954); State v. Cianflone,
98 Conn. 454, 469, 120 A. 347, 353 (1923); People v. Palmer, 27 III. 2d 311, 314-15,
189 N.E.2d 265, 267-68 (1963); People v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 2d 253, 260, 161
N.E.2d 268, 272 (1959); People v. Giacomino, 347 M11. 523, 528, 180 N.E. 437, 439
(1932); Commonwealth v. Gockley, 411 Pa. 437, 455, 192 A.2d 693, 702 (1963);
State v. Chasteen, 228 S.C. 88, 99, 88 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1955); cf. United States v.
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may hold that a particular isolated instance of improper intervention
by a trial judge, even if prejudicial in itself, did not deprive a litigant
of a fair trial.71  As the Supreme Court has warned in another context,
"We must guard against the magnification on appeal of instances which
were of little importance in their setting. ' 72  If, then, the evidence
overwhelmingly supports one party's case, intervention is not likely to
be held prejudicial. 73
Appellate court objections to the judge's interventions in the trial
may be "cured" by the trial judge's instructions to the jurors that they
are not to draw any inferences from his comments,7 4 and that they are
the sole finders of fact.75 The Ninth Circuit has succinctly stated the
underlying reason for refusing to reverse when such instructions were
given at trial: "We must assume that the jury followed those instruc-
tions. ' 70 Some courts, however, have rejected the rationale that a trial
judge's instructions to the jury will cure improper interventions, unless
the interventions were "only brief and minor departures from judicial
impartiality. ' 77  The Supreme Court has recognized that in some con-
texts a jury either "will not or cannot" follow instructions.78 Recent
Johnson, 463 F.2d 216, 217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972) (discretion
to allow recess in trial); Napolitano v. Compania Sud Americana de Vapores, 421
F.2d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 1970) (discretion to determine proper scope of cross-examina-
tion).
71. United States v. Kaufman, 393 F.2d 172, 178 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1098 (1968).
72. United States v. Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 83 (1942).
73. See note 99 infra.
74. United States v. Pellegrino, 470 F.2d 1205, 1208 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 918 (1973) (court's instructions are "a factor that to some extent mitigates
any impression created by a trial court's interruptions"); United States v. Cruz, 455
F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
75. United States v. Cassell, 440 F.2d 569, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Calabrese, 421 F.2d 108, 113 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970); Bush v.
United States, 267 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1959). See also United States v. Frascone,
299 F.2d 824, 829 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 910 (1962).
76. Carroll v. United States, 326 F.2d 72, 83 (9th Cir. 1963); cf. note 29 supra.
77. Crowe v. DiManno, 225 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1955); see United States v.
May, 478 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. D'Anna, 450 F.2d 1201, 1206
(2d Cir. 1971).
78. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (jury instructions
not substitute for right of cross-examination); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964)
(jury determination of voluntariness and truthfulness of confession); Opper v. United
States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954) (inadmissibility of one defendant's confession to prove
guilt of co-defendant); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949) (same). For
a general discussion of the ability of a jury to follow instructions, see Skidmore v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948).
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cases from the Second Circuit suggest, moreover, that instructions to
the jury are less likely to have any curative effect when the evidence
in the case is conflicting.79 When the trial judge's actions have been
extreme-for example, a trial judge's statement that defendant's counsel
intentionally misled the jurys° -the instructions to disregard the judge's
statement have properly been held to have no curative effect."1
An additional consideration is relevant when a trial judge comments
on the conduct of counsel. Some courts have held that there was no
deprivation of a fair trial when the comments were "invited."82  On
the other hand, comments to counsel have been held prejudicial even
when provoked if they demonstrated a lack of impartiality that may
have influenced the jury.83
Appellate courts have also held that a party may waive his objec-
tion to the trial judge's interventions by failing to raise the objection
at trial.8 Failure to object is more likely to be held to prevent re-
versal in state courts that in federal courts. The Federal Rules of
79. Comparc United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 848 (1973) (facts not in dispute), with United States v. Grunberger, 431
F.2d 1062, 1069 (2d Cir. 1970) (facts in dispute).
80. United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833, 834 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v.
Brandt, 196 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1952) (trial judge asked over 900 questions dur-
ing trial); Lau Lee v. United States, 67 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1933); Hunter v. United
States, 62 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1932).
81. United States v. Dopf, 434 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1970); Lau Lee v. United
States, 67 F.2d 156, 158 (9th Cir. 1933).
82. United States v. Pellegrino, 470 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 918 (1973) (comments invited by counsel's "admittedly ambiguous and repetitious
questions"); United States v. Cruz, 455 F.2d 184, 185 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 918 (1972) (overly repetitious and extended cross-examination); United States v.
Lee, 107 F.2d 522, 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 659 (1939) (trial judge's
remarks regrettable, but not unwarranted); cf. United States v. McCarthy, 473 F.2d 300
(2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Budzanoski, 462 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1972); Burger,
Remarks on Trial Advocacy: A Proposition, 7 WASHBuRN LJ. 15 (1967).
83. Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 915 (1955). But cf. Herman v. United States, 289 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1961)
(judge reprimanded both counsel).
84. United States v. Stone, 431 F.2d 1286, 1291 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 912 (1971); Bush v. United States, 267 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1959):
Merely because a statement is made or a question asked by the court or
counsel in the heat of a spirited trial which subsequently in the cool of the
ivory tower of appellate court chambers seems inappropriate does not make the
stating nor the asking prejudicial error.
McDade v. State, 49 Ala. App. 533, 274 So. 2d 89 (1972); Hart v. Farris, 218 Cal. 69,
21 P.2d 432 (1933); Bova v. Bova, 135 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. App. 1940).
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Criminal Procedures5 provide for the recognition of "plain error"
whether the error is brought to the attention of the court by the
objecting party or on the court's own motion. Although there is no
"plain error" rule applicable to civil appeals in the federal courts, the
appellate courts have recognized an inherent power to consider errors
that prejudicially affect fundamental rights, whether or not the errors
are raised at trial.86  In the states, local procedure may prevent recog-
nition of any error unless a timely objection has been made.87  The
recent Supreme Court decision in Webb v'. Texas,88 however, may ease
the strictness of such local procedure. In Webb, the state court trial
judge singled out the defendant's sole witness for a "lengthy and intimi-
dating warning" not to commit perjury.89 The defendant did not object
until the judge had finished his admonition, by which time the witness
had been effectively driven off the stand. In reversing Webb's con-
viction, the Court held that the defendant had not waived his objection
because under the circumstances the defendant was not required to inter-
rupt the judge in the middle of his statement.90
In evaluating the propriety of a trial judge's interventions, some courts
have focused on whether the intervention was excessive or persistent. 91
Extensive questioning of one party's witnesses is more likely to influence
the jury prejudically than an isolated incident of improper judicial
85. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b): Harmless Error and Plain Error:
Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be no-
ticed although they are not brought to the attention of the court.
See Surratt v. United States, 269 F.2d 240, 240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (per curiam),
applying FED. R. CRim. P. 52(b); cf. United States v. Cruz, 455 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972).
86. See, e.g., Taylor v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 433 F.2d 569, 571 (10th
Cir. 1970); Blier v. United States Lines Co., 286 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 836 (1961); E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Cudd, 176 F.2d 855, 857
(10th Cir. 1949); cf. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 555-56 (1941).
87. See, e.g., Hart v. Farris, 218 Cal. 69, 72, 21 P.2d 432, 434 (1933); Bailey v.
State, 6 Md. App. 496, 252 A.2d 85 (1969); Bova v. Bova, 135 S.W.2d 384 (Mo.
App. 1940). See also Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider
Questions Not Properly Raised and Preserved, 7 Wis. L. Rav. 91 (1932); Vestal, Sua
Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FOR)HAm L. Rav. 477 (1958).
88. 409 U.S. 95 (1972), rev'g 480 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971).
89. Id. at 97.
90. 409 U.S. 95 (1972).
91. Jackson v. United States, 329 F.2d 893, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States
v. Fry, 304 F.2d 296, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1962); United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833,
834 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Brandt, 196 F.2d 653, 656 (2d Cir. 1952); People
v. Adler, 274 App. Div. 820, 80 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1948).
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questioning,92 particularly in a criminal trial in which the judge has
directed his questioning mainly to the defendant or the defendant's wit-
nesses. 93 Similarly, the cumulative effect of a trial judge's disparaging
remarks to counsel, although individually harmless, may require rever-
sal.94  Other courts, while recognizing that excessive intervention should
not be commended, have nevertheless held that the extent of the trial
judge's intervention is irrelevant if the individual interventions are
properf 5
In summary, there are three aspects of a trial judge's intervention
that an appellate court may consider. The first is the propriety of the
interventions: What was the purpose of the intervention? Did the trial
judge usurp the role of the jury or counsel? Was the focus of the inter-
vention balanced? The second consideration is the extent of interven-
tion: Were there isolated instances or continuous interventions? What
was the cumulative effect of the interventions? Finally, appellate courts
may consider the presence of qualifying circumstances: Were admoni-
tions invited by counsel? Were there any "curative" instructions? Was
there a timely objection? Was the evidence supporting the jury's verdict
sufficient to outweigh the effects of the judge's interventions?
B. Application of General Principles: The Second Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has re-
cently heard more appeals challenging trial judges' interventions than
the other circuit courts.96 An examination of four recent appeals to
92. United States v. DeSisto, 289 F.2d 833, 834 (2d Cir. 1961).
93. United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Tobin, 426 F.2d 1279 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1044 (1970); United States v. Hill, 332 F.2d 105
(7th Cir. 1964); Holmes v. United States, 271 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1959); Blunt v.
United States, 244 F.2d 355 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Hall v. State, 250 Miss. 253, 165 So. 2d
345 (1964); People v. Herman, 255 App. Div. 314, 7 N.Y.S.2d 560 (1938); Anderson
v. State, 27 Wyo. 345, 196 P. 1047 (1921). But see United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d
297, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1954).
94. See generally United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 385-91 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973).
95. United States v. Lewis, 338 F.2d 137, 140-41 (6th Cir. 1964) (intervention
proper though trial judge asked 1100 questions of witnesses); United States v. DeFillo,
257 F.2d 835, 839 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 915 (1959). See also
Goldman v. Fenn, 252 F.2d 47, 48 (1st Cir. 1958).
96. United States v. Kaylor, No. 73-1530 (2d Cir., Oct. 15, 1973); United States
v. Newman, 41 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 367 (1973); United
States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d
737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 848 (1973); United States v. Nazzaro, 472 F.2d
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the Second Circuit may, therefore, place in perspective the factors gen-
erally considered by appellate courts in varying factual situations.
In United States v. Pellegrino97 appellant challenged the trial judge's
extensive questioning of the Government's principal witness during cross-
examination. The court -affirmed the conviction, 9s citing five reasons
why appellant had not been denied a fair trial: the questioning was
designed to clarify testimony; the comments were invited; the charge to
the jury cautioned against inferring any opinion of the trial judge as to
defendant's guilt; the judge's questions "cut both ways;" and the evi-
dence pointed overwhelmingly to defendant's guilt.09  In short, the
trial judge's interventions did not convey an "impression of partisanship"
to the jury. 00
In United States v. Boatnd- 0' appellant had been convicted'02 fol-
lowing a trial characterized by unmistakable hostility between the judge
and defense counsel.10 3 The conviction was affirmed, however, because
the judge's comments, although objectionable, were directed only to de-
fense counsel, not to the credibility or strength of defendant's case, most
of the objectionable incidents took place in the absence of the jury,
and the judge issued strong curative instructions. 0 4 Moreover, the
302 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Pellegrino, 470 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 918 (1973); United States v. Cruz, 455 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 918 (1972); United States v. D'Anna, 450 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1970); see Painter v. Leake,
485 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hoker, 483 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1973).
97. 470 F.2d 1205 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 918 (1973).
98. Pellegrino was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1970) for interstate
transportation of stolen property.
99. 470 F.2d at 1207-08.
100. Id. at 1207.
101. 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 848 (1973).
102. The conviction was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1970) (possession of
counterfeit currency).
103. Following the judge's sustaining of a prosecution objection to defense coun-
sel's cross-examination of a witness, defense counsel argued with the judge and the
following exchange occurred:
The Court: Stop it.
Mr. Gold [defense counsel]: I am not-
The Court: I will not take any impudence.
Mr. Gold: I am not being impudent.
The Court: Don't do that.
Mr. Gold: I am not doing anything, if it please your honor.
The Court: Excuse the jury.
478 F.2d at 739. In the absence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial and
a bitter exchange between defense counsel and the trial judge ensued. Id.
104. Id. See United States v. Newman, 481 F.2d 222 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 94
S. Ct. 367 (1973), in which the court affirmed a conviction despite extensive ques.
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Government's extensive evidence was virtually uncontested by defend-
ant. 05
In contrast to Pellegrino and Boatner, the evidence in United States v.
Nazzaro0 6 was conflicting. Determination of defendant's guilt or inno-
cence thus turned upon the jury's view of the credibility of the witnesses
presented by the opposing parties. The court reversed defendant's
conviction 1 7 because the trial judge's questioning tended to buttress
the credibility of prosecution witnesses and discredit the testimony of
defense witnesses."0 " Even more damaging to defendant was the
trial judge's constant questioning of defense witnesses, which may have
created the impression that the trial judge had assumed the prosecu-
tor's role. 0 9 Reinforcing the appellate court's conclusion that de-
fendant must receive a new trial was the fact that several objectionable
exchanges between the trial judge and defense counsel had occurred
in the presence of the jury."'
In United States v. Fernandez"' defendant was convicted of armed
tioning by the trial judge because the witness was evasive, no objection was made at
the time, and cautionary instructions were issued to the jury.
For an example of a "curative" instruction which was cited with favor, see United
States v. Aaron, 190 F.2d 144, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1951):
If, during the course of the trial, I made any statements that may have indi-
cated to you that I have an opinion as to the ultimate facts in this case, you
are to disregard them. They are not binding on you, because, as I have
stated, you are the exclusive judges of the facts and the credibility of the wit-
nesses.
On one occasion I did make a comment with respect to the testimony of
the witness Louis Rosen. You are to disregard that comment made by me
because, as I indicated to you, you members of the jury are the exclusive
judges of the facts and are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses
who have appeared before you and, in the last analysis, the responsibility is
yours to decide those facts and to render your verdict accordingly.
During the trial I have addressed questions to some of the witnesses and
have made statements to counsel. Such questions as were asked by me were
for the purpose of eliciting facts to aid you in your deliberations. If any of
you have formed any impression that I accentuated certain facts elicited, you
must put that completely out of your minds. All facts were elicited for the
purpose only of aiding you in your deliberations and were not intended to be,
nor are they any expression by me on the facts or the credibility of any of
the witnesses.
105. 478 F.2d at 742.
106. 472 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1973).
107. Defendant was convicted under Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, tit. I, § 106,
70 Stat. 570, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 545 (1970) (smuggling).
108. 472 F.2d at 307-08.
109. Id. at 308-09.
110. Id. at 312.
111. 480 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1973).
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robbery,"' largely on the basis of photographic evidence. The trial
judge examined the defense witnesses extensively and made antagonistic
remarks to defendant's expert witness who was testifying on the validity
of the photographic evidence." 8  Because of these apparently partisan
actions by the trial judge, the appeals court reversed the conviction,
emphasizing that in light of the conflicting factual evidence the judge's
conduct might well have influenced the jury's verdict.
These four cases demonstrate how the interaction of various factors
influence appellate review of interventions by trial judges. In each of
these cases, the reviewing court considered the three primary aspects of
the trial judge's intervention-propriety, extent, and qualifying circum-
stances." 4 In Pellegrino, for example, the judge's questioning, although
extensive, was permissible to clarify the testimony. In addition, curative
instructions were issued and the evidence supporting conviction was
sufficient to outweigh any damage caused by the extent of the trial
judge's interventions. Consequently, the conviction was affirmed. In
Nazzaro and Fernandez, however, the judge's actions were improper
because they focused on defense witnesses, leaving the impression that
the judge had assumed the role of the prosecutor. Moreover, the ques-
tioning was extensive and there was an absence of mitigating circum-
stances. The convictions in these cases were, therefore, reversed.
While Nazzaro, Fernandez, and Pellegrino were correctly decided,
the court's action in Boatner is questionable since the court recognized
the clearly objectionable character of the trial judge's comments and the
atmosphere of hostility that pervaded the trial. Because most exchanges
between the judge and defense counsel were not in the presence of the
jury, however, the issuance of curative instructions was sufficient to
counteract any unfavorable impressions of the defendant received by
the jury.115
V. SUGGESTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Judicial intervention at trial represents the "ultimate clash between the
adversary philosophy on the one hand and the notion of impartial ad-
ministration of justice on the other.""0  Excessive intervention dimin-
112. Conviction was pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d) (1970) (armed bank
robbery).
113. 480 F.2d at 742-46.
114. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
115. Cf. note 104 supra.
116. Louisell, 1959 Institute for California Judges-Panel Discussion, Part I: Pre-
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ishes the effectiveness of the adversary system and may deprive a liti-
gant of his right to an impartially administered trial. Noninterven-
tion, however, may also infringe principles of fairness in those instances
in which the adversary proceedings manifestly fail to test the truth-
fulness of the allegations made.
State appellate court emphasis on non-participation by trial judges
has prompted some observers to perceive trials as "games" or "sporting
contests" with counsel acting as contestants and judge as referee. 117
Roscoe Pound, for example, commented that "the inquiry is not, what
do substantive law and justice require? Instead, the inquiry is have the
rules of the game been carried out strictly?"118 Pound's observation
emphasizes the dangers inherent in rigid adherence to the adversary
system. To minimize these risks, the dispensation of justice in an ad-
versary framework must recognize that some diminution of the adver-
sary approach to trials is necessary because an advocate's primary goal
is obtaining a favorable result for his client, not aiding the court in
discovering the facts.119
As a result of the increased number of appeals, particularly in the
federal courts,' involving the propriety and extent of judicial inter-
vention, it has become apparent that approaching the problem of
judicial intervention on a case-by-case basis will not facilitate the de-
velopment of standards to govern judicial intervention at trial.
In response to the need for such guidelines, two operationally prac-
tical suggestions have been proposed for instances in which judicial
intervention might prejudice the jury against one of the parties. First,
with respect to questioning witnesses, it has been recommended that,
except in the case of a recalcitrant witness, the judge should delay his
questions until counsel have completed their questioning. The trial
judge should then confer with counsel, out of the hearing of the jury,
on the advisability of his intended line of questioning.' 2 ' One objec-
tion to this suggestion is that the value of the trial judge's clarifying
liminar, Matters and Trial Proceedings, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 703, 718-19 (1959).
117. 1 WIGMORE § 21; Pound, supra note 17; cf. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279.
118. Pound, supra note 17, at 739, 8 BAYLOR L. REv. at 15.
119. J. FRANA, COURTS ON TRIAL 102 (Antheneum ed. 1969); see id. at 80-107.
120. See United States v. Boatner, 478 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 848
(1973) (citing cases). See also Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. RE. 751, 757 (1957).
121. Louisell, supra note 116, at 719; Thomas, supra note 29.
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questions would be diminished because the questions would not be
presented until the conclusion of counsers examination. This objec-
tion, however, appears specious since under the aforementioned pro-
posal the trial judge need not delay his clarifying questions because there
is little possibility that they would prejudice either party. Secondly,
with respect to admonishing counsel, it has been proposed that the trial
judge call counsel to the bench after the first infraction and issue a
warning outside the hearing of the jury. Any further conduct by coun-
sel deemed to be in willful disregard of the admonition might then be
handled directly.122
In view of the development of limitations on the trial judge's inter-
vention, it would now be burdensome, even if desirable, to return to the
common law tradition of active judicial intervention at trial. The Su-
preme Court in Quercia held that when a conflict arises between the
active role of the trial judge and the principle that the judge must not
appear to be an advocate, the latter must control. 123  Moreover, the
American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct, reflecting the
considerable influence of the legal profession, has adopted a more
moderate role for the trial judge than the role followed at common
law.' 24 Assuming that some degree of judicial intervention at trial will
be maintained, the legal profession, and courts in particular, must at-
tempt to formulate standards to guide judges in determining the neces-
sity for and propriety of intervening at trial.
122. Hudson, Controlling the Trial and Supervising the Courtroom, in PnocEnD-
iNOS OF THE NATONAL CONFERENCE OF TmiAL JUDGES 25, 27-28 (1967); Thomas,
supra note 29, at 71.
123. 289 U.S. at 470. See also United States v. Fernandez, 480 F.2d 726 (2d
Cir. 1973).
124. Compare ABA CANONS OF JUDICLAL ETIfCS No. 15 (expressly allowing inter-
vention by trial judge) with ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDuCr No. 3 (no discussion
of trial judge's right to intervene), reprinted in 58 A.B.A.J. 1207 (1972).
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